A Metacognitive Exercise Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 4250 words

A Metacognitive Exercise - Essay Example Reflecting on the modules and the readings, is that language and literacy learning is both overwhelming and, surprisingly, well-researched. Overwhelming because the depth of research is staggering, from the selection of reading texts to a child’s stages of cognitive development, to the variables affecting interpretation and meaning. This initial sense of being overwhelmed, however, later gives way to a sense of security as the readings come together to form a more comprehensive whole. To be sure, there are theoretical disagreements. There are areas in need of additional research. That said, there really is a sufficient groundwork, in both theoretical and practical terms, with which to plan meaningful literacy lessons and programmes. The text emphasised the significant effects of word choice in the narrative text. The choice of words such as "reared" and "crushed" and the use of punctuation such as "Thud!" truly affected the mood and the feeling conveyed by the text. As a menta l exercise, I arbitrarily changed some of the words in order to see how the meaning might be altered; the results were quite significant. In sum, from the point of view of a student or a writer, I find the concepts of metalanguage and social purposes of text very helpful both in terms of understanding a text and in terms of creating a text. Though seemingly intuitive, these concepts add very much to the understanding of language, linguistic features, and meaning. To this regard I have the initiative to improve myself by answering the following activities: Activity: Describe the genre used by the seven-year-old child in the following text. List the features in terms of use of verbs, general and specific participants and descriptive words and statements. What understandings of the convention of written language does she demonstrate "I was going Dawn cabell terast on my Big Bieck. It was a Stiep Hill and my brakes pat up when I was haf the wai dan the hill and I broacd my coliaBone and I had to to go to the hosPtall to get a slliea on it. Its getting beta, ten I can ride I't a gain" Answer Using what I have learned from Green and Campbell, I recognized the genre of the text as a narrative. It tells the story of a seven year old boy in a sequential manner- precisely how Green and Campbell defined narratives. It also uses past tense form of verbs and makes use of the linking verb "and" to denote what happened next. It can also be recognized that the text is full of grammatical errors such as spelling and punctuation. However, it can be seen that the child is able to use the basic Subject - Object construction with the verb in between. The text displays the " how you pronounce it is how you spell and write it" system. Entry 2: Being particularly interested in writing, I found the work by

Parrallel Universe Theory

Parrallel Universe Theory Today, astronomers can see out to a distance of approximately 42 billion light-years, our cosmic visual horizon, and we have no reason to believe that the universe ends there (Physics for Dummies, 2011). There exists the possibility that there are an infinite number of domains beyond our own. The majority of cosmologists today agree with the concept of a multiverse where the same laws of physics apply in all domains, but some dare to take the notion even further. Some physicians believe in the existence of infinite parallel universes with different laws of physics, alternate histories and other dimensions than ours (Science Universe, 2012). With this essay, I aim to pursue the parallel universe theory in order to determine its validity outside the realm of science-fiction. I will explore the justifications for it as well as the criticisms against it by consulting the theories of various cosmologists and quantum physicians. The ultimate reason for this pursuit is to determine whether or not the theory of parallel universes can be considered as an indisputable scientific fact or should rather remain in the world of fiction. Before proceeding, I need to state the limitations and scope of this paper and clearly disclose the structure in which the subject matter will be discussed. Firstly, I will define a parallel universe and provide some background information on the subject, as will be applicable to the essays content. Secondly, I will identify the theories that support the idea of parallel universes and organise them according to a cosmological or quantum physics perspective. Thirdly, I will identify the theories that criticise the idea of parallel universes and again organise them according to a cosmological or quantum physics perspective. Lastly, after analyzing both schools of thought, I will conclude my findings and determine if parallel universes are indeed fact or fiction. Part 1: Parallel Universes: Definition and Background To understand the concept of a parallel universe, one must first define the umbrella term it falls under, namely a multiverse. The multiverse theory claims that our universe is not the only one of its kind and that there exists many universes parallel to one another (The Theory of Parallel Universes, 2011). The universes that exist within this multiverse are called parallel universes. These multiple universes consist of everything and anything that can exist in matter, time, energy and space (The Theory of Parallel Universes, 2011). Other terms that are used to refer to parallel universes include quantum universes, alternative universes, alternative realities or parallel worlds. The following paragraphs will give an overview of some scientific theories on parallel universes in order to give an understanding of the argument and the logic that supports the notion. We will first look at the argument as approached from a cosmological perspective. According to Ellis (2011), if the universe and the possible histories that take place within it are infinite and the number of types of DNA-based beings are finite, then this infinite universe will contain an infinite amount of copies of these finite DNA-based beings. He goes on to say that, given this argument, some of these living beings will inevitably follow very similar lines of history (Ellis, 2011). In lay terms, when given the prospect of an infinite amount of histories combined with finite types of living beings, these histories will repeat to infinitum. However, Soler Gil and Alfonseca (2013) do not agree that if there are an infinite amount of possible histories, that these histories will necessarily be repeated in parallel universes. They state that given this scenario, the amount of histories will always be greater than the number of living beings, therefore if these beings are infinitely repeated they will still experience different histories (Soler Gil and Alfonseca, 2 013). Given this brief background overview, it is evident that the scientific community is still heavily divided on the notion of the existence of parallel universes. We will now continue by evaluating more detailed descriptions of theories that promote and refute the existence of parallel universes. For the purpose of this paper, we will only draw from the fields of cosmology and quantum physics. Part 2: Theories that promote the Existence of Parallel Universes Quantum physics is the science that attempts to explain phenomena which cannot be explained by the regular laws of science and physics. The parallel universe theory was first formulated in 1956 by Hugh Everett. Everett formulated this theory in an attempt to substantiate his belief that every probable outcome of any decision we make, does actually happen. He claimed that even though we may choose option A in this universe, we will choose option B in a parallel universe (Everett, 1956). Everetts theory is relatively new to the history of physics but it has already become a popular and controversial topic in the scientific community. This proposal was coined the Many-Worlds Interpretation. It essentially states that any object can be in any state at any time in a different parallel universe (Everett, 1956). This implies that the wavefunction of a state of being does not collapse at the moment of observation (like we observe in the Double-Slit Experiment later in the paper), but rather continues to evolve in a deterministic manner while simultaneously embracing all its possibilities (Everett, 1956). Everett (1956) notes that even though every possible outcome does exist simultaneously, they do not interfere with one another due to the fact that we are unable to observe these alternate realities. The Cosmological Perspective Max Tegmark, a well known modern cosmologist, states that if space is indeed infinite and inhabited by a finite number of living beings, then there is bound to be some identical occurrences that take place in different universes (Tegmark, 1997). Tegmark goes on to make use of a mathematical equation to calculate the probable distance of our nearest doppelgà ¤nger at any given time. His answer being approximately 1010115 meters. This theory coincides with a fundamental conjecture of cosmology, namely that the universe exists beyond the scope of our observation. Tegmark formulated a categorisation that recognizes four different levels of the multiverse where each level builds on the previous one. Tegmark (1997) refers to the first level as the level Beyond our Cosmological Horizon. This refers to an infinite universe that contains Hubble volumes that concern themselves with realising all primary conditions. Tegmark (1997) states that an infinite universe will necessarily contain an infinite amount of Hubble volumes that are subjected to the same physical laws. Given this precedent, there are bound to be Hubble volumes that have identical configurations to ours in some universes. This statement is rooted in the cosmological principle that states that we do not possess a unique Hubble volume. The second level concerns Universes with Different Physical Constants (Tegmark, 1997). He coins these universes as bubble universes and claims that our universe is just one of many bubble universes in existence. Tegmark (1997) then builds on the cosmic inflation theory in order to justify his argument that although the multiverse is infinitely stretching, there are some regions that cease to stretch. Once they become stationery, they form bubbles that may possess differing physical constants. The third level is an expression of the Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Tegmark, 1997). One feature of quantum mechanics is that there is no observation that can be predicted with absolute certainty, but there is rather a range of probable observations. By applying this feature to the many-worlds interpretation, one can deduce that each probable observation should be compatible with a different universe. Tegmark (1997) explains that the difference between level one and level three is that in level one our doppelgà ¤ngers reside in a three-dimensional space whereas in level three they reside in an infinite-dimensional space. The fourth level is referred to as the Ultimate Ensemble or the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (Tegmark, 1997). He claims that due to mathematics abstract nature, one can use a mathematical structure to prove just about any Theory of Everything (Tegmark, 1997). Given this statement, one can describe any imaginable parallel universe at level four and include all other ensembles by simply using mathematics. By doing so, one will bring an end to the multiverse hierarchy and eliminate any probability of the existence of a fifth level. Even though Tegmark does utilise some characteristics of quantum mechanics to promote the existence of parallel universes, he is fundamentally a cosmologist. There is, however, another physician that uses the field of quantum physics more extensively in this pursuit. In the next section we will evaluate Brian Greenes argument for the existence of parallel universes from a quantum physics perspective. The Quantum Physics Perspective Before discussing Greenes application of quantum physics to promote the existence of parallel universes, we first need to recognize three observations about quantum physics. Firstly, energy has the ability to travel through space without having the need to cover the superseding distance (Physics for Dummies, 2011). This means that energy and quantum particles possess the ability to exist in more than one place at a time. This observation is clearly fundamental for the substantiation of the parallel universe theory from a quantum physics perspective. Secondly, all quantum particles exist in different places at any given time, even though we are unable to see them (Physics for Dummies, 2011). Given this observation, there is a possibility that doppelgà ¤ngers may exist in different locations. Thirdly, quantum particles are influenced by the practice of observation when we observe them (Physics for Dummies, 2011), which plays an important role later in the paper when we discuss the Dou ble-Slit Experiment. Greene attempts to comprehend the origin of multiverses by utilising string theory. String theory speculates that the universe can be described in terms of small strings that vibrate in ten or eleven different dimensions that we are unable to see (Greene, 2011). Greene (2011) claims that string theory not only includes strings but also objects that resemble two-dimensional membranes. He goes on to suggest that we may be living on one of these two-dimensional surfaces and that other surfaces may be floating around us in space. This claim is currently without any emprirical evidence, but Green (2011) says that this can be tested in the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN. If Greenes hypothesis is correct, then when particles are slammed together in the LHC, debris can be emitted off of our membrane surface and into the greater cosmos where our membrane is floating. This loss of debris will take away some amount of energy in our universe. We can then measure the amount of energy and com pare it to the amount that was present before the collision. If there is found to be less energy afterwards, it would indicate that some energy had been launched into the greater cosmos (Greene, 2011). This particular outcome of the experiment will prove that Greenes hypothesis is correct. However, until this experiment at CERN takes place and is found to be successful, Greenes hypothesis remains pure speculation. Part 3: Theories that refute the Existence of Parallel Universes The Cosmological Perspective Cosmologist, Paul Davies, is a firm believer that notions of parallel universes belong in the realm of scientific philosophy and not in physics. Even though all cosmologists accept the existence of other regions that we are not able to observe, most of them do not deduce the existence of infinite universes from this precedent. Davies addresses the topic in his New York Times opinion piece by saying that physicists should not believe a theory based on faith, but rather insist on hard scientific facts supported by empirical evidence: The multiverse theory may be dressed up in scientific language, but in essence it requires a leap of faith (Davies, 2007). George Ellis is another cosmologist who shares the same sentiment as Davies towards the parallel universe theory. Ellis (2011) points out that the basic problem with the multiverse proposal is the existence of a cosmic visual horizon, as we will never be able to observe these universes even if they did exist. He also rejects the application of string theory, as attempted by Greene (2011), in order to substantiate the plausibility of the parallel universe theory. Ellis (2011) states that string theory is not yet a complete theory that has been tested or proven. He admits, however, that if string theory is ever proven correct then there will be a legitimate argument for the existence of a multiverse. Ellis (2011) concludes that multiverse proposals are merely scientifically based philosophical speculation and cannot even qualify as a well-defined scientific theory. He states that before the multiverse proposal can be considered to be a scientific theory, it needs to be coherent and not just a patchwork of different ideas (Ellis, 2011). The Quantum Physics Perspective The most common criticism of the parallel universe theory is the lack of scientific facts derived from empirical evidence collected by means of observation and experiments. It has proven difficult to acquire scientific proof for the existence of alternate realities for many reasons, one of these reasons being that by observing reality, we are also altering it. This fascinating notion is demonstrated by the famous Double-Slit Experiment (Live Science, 2012). Essentially, this experiment proves that energy and matter display characteristics of particles and waves, indicating the fundamental probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics. In a basic Double-Slit Experiment, we observe the light of a laser beam aimed towards a thin plate pierced with two parallel slits. The wave-like nature of the light results in the light waves interfering with each other while passing through the two slits. When observed from behind the plate, one sees bright and dark bands being created, which is unexpecte d if one were to assume that light only consisted of particles. Instead of acting like particles, the light becomes absorbed on the screen as if it consisted of photons or discrete particles (Live Science, 2012). The mysterious result of this experiment lead to the detection of the inherent probabilistic nature of individual photons. When Deutsche (2001) conducted his version of the Double-Slit Experiment, he took the findings even further. He states that when we perceive a photon passing through one slit, a parallel universe might perceive a photon passing through another slit. According to Deutsche (2001), our universe is the reality of the tangible particles that we observe whereas the reality of the shadow particles is actually a parallel universe. However, there are very strong arguments against Deutschs interpretation of the findings of the Double-Slit Experiment. It is impossible to confirm Deutschs claim that the photon goes through one of the slits and not both because an interference pattern emerges when we try to measure this (Sturman, 2011). Even though the standard way of approaching quantum mechanics does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the Double-Slit Experiment in terms of a single universe, it does not give precedent to an unverified theory of a multiverse that might explain it better. After observing that when a photon passes through the first slit, it interferes with a photon that might have passed through the second slit, Deutsch deduces that a photon must have passed through the second slit in a parallel universe (Sturman, 2011). This, however, is unsatisfactory due to the fact that Deutsch has not proven that the photon passes through one of the two slits even though it could have passed through the other slit. There is still a distinct possibility that the photon is passing through both slits at the same time in our universe (Sturman, 2011). What I think Deutsche has forgotten in his pursuit to desperately prove the existence of parallel universes, is that the role of physics is to describe what we experience in our world. When we consider the notion of doppelgà ¤ngers in different universes which we cannot observe, we are stretching the field of physics to be greater than our experiential reality. In my opinion, this cannot be considered science, but rather speculation. Conclusion After analyzing both schools of thought on the existence of parallel universes, I remain firmly unconvinced by this theory. The unverified cosmological arguments made by Tegmark (1997) and the futile attempts of Greene (2011) and Deutschs (2001) quantum physics approach did not succeed in convincing me that parallel universes exist. Even though I approached this concept with an open mind, one must still require empirical evidence before confirming any theory to be remotely factual. Given the evidence, I can confidently conclude that the case for the existence of parallel universes remains unproven for now. However, I have found the contemplation of a multiverse extremely enticing as a way to reflect on the nature of our existence. There is no doubt that the concept belongs in the realm of philosophy for now, but the lack of scientific proof does not leave it entirely worthless. We should rather embrace what multiverse proposals truly are scientifically based philosophical speculatio n (Ellis, 2011). By doing this we can bring newfound legitimacy to the subject. Instead of trying to force it into the field of natural sciences, where it clearly does not belong, we should welcome it in the field of social science. I think that by doing this, we will enable the concept of parallel universes to be explored to its full potential without the boundaries set by the scientific method.

Cultural Differentiation and Moral Orientation: Taking an Interest in H

Cultural Differentiation and Moral Orientation In contrast with his major ethical works, Kant’s writings on history are replete with the theme of the social character of moral development and the interdependence of individual and community. I argue that historical-moral progress is an important part of Kant’s comprehensive ethical theory. However, in order to link the moral goals of humanity with the moral goals of individuals, judgement must have a dimension that can apprehend the purposiveness of those human achievements which are social in their significance and socially transmitted. In other words, such achievements transcend individual intention. The ‘historical signs’ of such moral purposiveness provide moral orientation through the conflicting claims that arise within and between complex and historically evolving human communities. I explore the role of disinterested judgement in providing this orientation and in marking the moral disposition of the species. In contrast with his major ethical works, Kant’s writings on history are replete with the theme of the social character of moral development and the interdependence of individual and community. Assuming for the moment that in some fundamental sense, moral decision making is an individual matter, how does the social context of human life affect morality? In particular what is the significance of the fact that our social structures are constituted over time? The thesis of this paper is that Kant's view on the nature of historical-moral progress is an important part of his comprehensive ethical theory. It sets the rational basis for the individual's moral obligation to promote the highest good by providing a moral orientation to guide her through the conflicting clai... ...al change is that while we can adjust our judgments concerning the culpability of past agents to their differing conditions, we cannot reverse or relativize our conception of what is right. (23) Kant, Immanuel, "An Old Question Raised Again", translated by Robert E. Anchor, in On History, op. cit., p. 144 (85). (24) Kant, Immnauel, "What is Enlightenment", translated by Lewis White Beck, in On History, op. cit., pp.4-5 In discussing the differences between the public and private uses of reason Kant makes reference to the possibility that on some occasions the individual will take the point of view of "a society of world citizens" . Thus, the appropriate public can be extended across national boundaries as well as across time. (25) Kant, Immnauel, "Idea for a Universal History", translated by Lewis White Beck, in On History, op cit., p. 24 (30), footnote 7.

Port Expander Research Paper

1. What is a Port Expander: A port expander is a device that allows one port on a computer system to connect to multiple devices. There are two basic forms of port expanders: internal and external. An internal expander has a connection inside the computer, typically on the motherboard, and the only part the user sees is the expansion plate containing multiple ports. An external device plugs into the existing port and then has multiple places to connect. When not part of a computer system, these devices are commonly known as splitters.2. Types of Port ExpandersUSB Port Expander FireWire Port Expander Ethernet Port Expander VGA Port Expander SCSI Port Expander Serial Port Expander Video Port Expander Audio Port Expander DVI Port Expander DB-25 Port Expander SATA Port Expander3. Are they generic,or can work on multiple computersThere are no specific types of ports for different computers in todays technology. All the computers from PC to Mac have all the same ports on them. Port Expande rs will work for just about any PC.4. Advantages and DisadvantagesAdvantages of using port expanders are that you get more ports to use. If you ever run out of VGA ports, usb, SCSI ,or even Ethernet ports. You can always buy a port expander for it whether it be internal or external. Also In Some cases port expanders are cheaper than getting an equal number of â€Å"real† ports. Disadvantages are a lot of them are external and they can get in the way of you working. Also could use more power and if your power source isn't good enough it could cause problems when you add more devices it consumes more power. The power source Milli amperage is limited theres only so many extra ports you can use. And if you over load the power source the computer wont turn on. Until you unplug them. And I read that it can possibly destroy the power supply but rarely.

Fraud Risk Management

Fraud risk management A guide to good practice 1 This guide is based on the fi rst edition of Fraud Risk Management: A Guide to Good Practice. The fi rst edition was prepared by a Fraud and Risk Management Working Group, which was established to look at ways of helping management accountants to be more effective in countering fraud and managing risk in their organisations. This second edition of Fraud Risk Management: A Guide to Good Practice has been updated by Helenne Doody, a specialist within CIMA Innovation and Development.Helenne specialises in Fraud Risk Management, having worked in related fi elds for the past nine years, both in the UK and other countries. Helenne also has a graduate certifi cate in Fraud Investigation through La Trobe University in Australia and a graduate certifi cate in Fraud Management through the University of Teeside in the UK. For their contributions in updating the guide to produce this second edition, CIMA would like to thank: Martin Birch FCMA, MBA Director – Finance and Information Management, Christian Aid.Roy Katzenberg Chief Financial Offi cer, RITC Syndicate Management Limited. Judy Finn Senior Lecturer, Southampton Solent University. Dr Stephen Hill E-crime and Fraud Manager, Chantrey Vellacott DFK. Richard Sharp BSc, FCMA, MBA Assistant Finance Director (Governance), Kingston Hospital NHS Trust. Allan McDonagh Managing Director, Hibis Europe Ltd. Martin Robinson and Mia Campbell on behalf of the Fraud Advisory Panel. CIMA would like also to thank those who contributed to the fi rst edition of the guide. About CIMACIMA, the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, is the only international accountancy body with a key focus on business. It is a world leading professional institute that offers an internationally recognised qualifi cation in management accounting, with a full focus on business, in both the private and public sectors. With 164,000 members and students in 161 countries, CIMA is committed to upho lding the highest ethical and professional standards of its members and students.  © CIMA 2008. All rights reserved.This booklet does not necessarily represent the views of the Council of the Institute and no responsibility for loss associated to any person acting or refraining from acting as a result of any material in this publication can be accepted by the authors or publishers. Acknowledgements Fraud risk management: a guide to good practice 2 Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Fraud – its extent, patterns and causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1. 1 What is fraud? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1. 2 The scale of the problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1. 3 Which businesses are affected? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1. 4 Why do people commit fraud? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1. 5 Who commits fraud? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1. 6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Risk management – an overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2. 1 Wh at is risk management? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2. 2 Corporate governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2. 3 The risk management cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2. 4 Establish a risk management group and set goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2. 5 Identify risk areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2. 6 Understand and assess the scale of risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2. 7 Develop a risk response strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2. 8 Implement the strategy and allocate responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2. 9 Implement and monitor suggested controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2. 10 Review and refi ne and do it again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2. 11 Information for decision making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2. 12 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Fraud prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3. 1 A strategy to combat fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3. 2 Developing a sound ethical culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 3. 3 Sound internal control systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3. 4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Fraud detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 4. 1 Detection methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 4. 2 Indicators and warnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4. 3 Tools and techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4. 4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Responding to fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5. 1 Purpose of the fraud response plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5. 2 Corpor ate policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5. 3 Defi nition of fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5. 4 Roles and responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5. 5 The response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 5. 6 The investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 5. 7 Organisation’s objectives with respect to dealing with fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5. 8 Follow-up action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5. 9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 1 2 3 4 5 3 Appendices Appendix 1 Fraud and the law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Appendix 2 Examples of common types of internal fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Appendix 3 Example of a risk analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Appendix 4 A sample fraud policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Appendix 5 Sample whistleblowing policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Appendix 6 Examples of fraud indicators, risks and controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Appendix 7 A 16 step fraud prevention plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Appendix 8 Outline fraud response plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Appendix 9 Example of a fraud response plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Appendix 10 References and further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Appendix 11 Listed abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Figures Figure 1 Types of internal fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Figure 2 The fraud triangle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Figure 3 The CIMA risk management cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Figure 4 Anti-fraud strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Figure 5 Ethics advice/services provided . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Figure 6 Meth ods of fraud detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Case Studies Case study 1 Fraud doesn’t involve just money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Case study 2 Size really doesn’t matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Case study 3 A breach of trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Case study 4 Management risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Case study 5 A fi ne warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Case study 6 Vet or regret? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Case study 7 Tipped off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Case study 8 Risk or returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Case study 9 Reporting fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Case study 10 TNT roots our fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 4 5 Periodically, the latest major fraud hits the headlines as other organisations sit back and watch, telling themselves that ‘it couldn’t happen here. ’ But the reality is that fraud can happen anywhere. While only relatively few major frauds are picked up by the media, huge sums are lost by all kinds of businesses as result of the high number of smaller frauds that are committed. Surveys are regularly carried out in an attempt to estimate the true scale and cost of fraud to business and society. Findings vary, and it is diffi cult to obtain a complete picture as to the full extent of the issue, but these surveys all indicate that fraud is prevalent within organisations and remains a serious and costly problem. The risks of fraud may only be increasing, as we see growing globalisation, more competitive markets, rapid developments in technology, and periods of economic diffi culty. Among other fi ndings, the various surveys highlight that: organisations may be losing as much as 7% of their annual turnover as a result of fraud †¢ corruption is esti mated to cost the global economy about $1. 5 trillion each year †¢ only a small percentage of losses from fraud are recovered by organisations †¢ a high percentage of frauds are committed by senior management and executives †¢ greed is one of the main motivators for committing fraud †¢ fraudsters often work in the fi nance function †¢ fraud losses are not restricted to a particular sector or country †¢ the prevalence of fraud is increasing in emerging markets. Introduction Despite the serious risk that fraud presents to business, any organisations still do not have formal systems and procedures in place to prevent, detect and respond to fraud. While no system is completely foolproof, there are steps which can be taken to deter fraud and make it much less attractive to commit. It is in assisting organisations in taking such steps that this guide should prove valuable. The original guide to good practice was based on the work of CIMA’s Fraud and Ri sk Management Working Group that was established as part of the Institute’s response to the problem of fraud. Since the publication of the original guide, we have continued to see high rofi le accounting scandals and unacceptable levels of fraudulent behaviour. This second edition of the guide includes updates to refl ect the many changes in the legal environment and governance agenda in recent years, aimed at tackling the ongoing problem of fraud. The guide starts by defi ning fraud and giving an overview of the extent of fraud, its causes and its effects. The initial chapters of the guide also set out the legal environment with respect to fraud, corporate governance requirements and general risk management principles. The guide goes on to discuss the key components of an anti-fraud strategy nd outlines methods for preventing, detecting and responding to fraud. A number of case studies are included throughout the guide to support the text, demonstrating real life problems th at fraud presents and giving examples of actions organisations are taking to fi ght fraud. Fraud risk management: a guide to good practice Management accountants, whose professional training includes the analysis of information and systems, can have a signifi cant role to play in the development and implementation of anti-fraud measures within their organisations. This guide is intended to help management accountants in that role and will also be seful to others with an interest in tackling fraud in their organisation. The law relating to fraud varies from country to country. Where it is necessary for this guide to make reference to specifi c legal measures, this is generally to UK law, as it would be impossible to include references to the laws of all countries where this guide will be read. It is strongly advised that readers ensure they are familiar with the law relating to fraud in their own jurisdiction. Although some references may therefore not be relevant to all readers, the general principles of fraud risk management will still apply and rganisations around the world are encouraged to take a more stringent approach to preventing, detecting and responding to fraud. 6 7 Defi nition of fraud The term ‘fraud’ commonly includes activities such as theft, corruption, conspiracy, embezzlement, money laundering, bribery and extortion. The legal defi nition varies from country to country, and it is only since the introduction of the Fraud Act in 2006, that there has been a legal defi nition of fraud in England and Wales. Fraud essentially involves using deception to dishonestly make a personal gain for oneself and/or create a loss for another. Although defi nitions vary, ost are based around these general themes. Fraud and the law Before the Fraud Act came into force, related offences were scattered about in many areas of the law. The Theft Acts of 1968 and 1978 created offences of false accounting, and obtaining goods, money and services by decept ion, and the Companies Act 1985 included the offence of fraudulent trading. This remains part of the Companies Act 2006. There are also offences of fraud under income tax and value-added tax legislation, insolvency legislation, and the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud. The Fraud Act is not the only new piece of legislation.Over the last few years there have been many changes to the legal system with regard to fraud, both in the UK and internationally. This guide focuses mainly on UK requirements, but touches on international requirements that impact UK organisations. In the UK, the Companies Act and the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) have been amended and legislation such as the Serious Crimes Act 2007 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) have been introduced. Internationally the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (Sarbox) has been introduced in the United States (US), a major piece of legislation that affects not only companies in the US ut also those in the UK and othe rs based all over the globe. Further information on these pieces of legislation can be found in Appendix 1. As well as updating the legislation in the UK, there have been, and will continue to be, signifi cant developments in the national approach to combating fraud, particularly as we see implementation of actions resulting from the national Fraud Review. Appendix 1 gives further information on the Fraud Review. There are also many law enforcement agencies involved in the fi ght against fraud in the UK, including the Serious Fraud Offi ce, the Serious Organised Crime Agency SOCA), the Financial Services Authority (FSA), and Economic Crime Units within the police force. Different types of fraud Fraud can mean many things and result from many varied relationships between offenders and victims. Examples of fraud include: †¢ crimes by individuals against consumers, clients or other business people, e. g. misrepresentation of the quality of goods; pyramid trading schemes †¢ em ployee fraud against employers, e. g. payroll fraud; falsifying expense claims; thefts of cash, assets or intellectual property (IP); false accounting †¢ crimes by businesses against investors, consumers and employees, e. g. i nancial statement fraud; selling counterfeit goods as genuine ones; not paying over tax or National Insurance contributions paid by staff †¢ crimes against fi nancial institutions, e. g. using lost and stolen credit cards; cheque frauds; fraudulent insurance claims †¢ crimes by individuals or businesses against government, e. g. grant fraud; social security benefi t claim frauds; tax evasion †¢ crimes by professional criminals against major organisations, e. g. major counterfeiting rings; mortgage frauds; ‘advance fee’ frauds; corporate identity fraud; money laundering †¢ e-crime by people using computers and technology to commit crimes, e. . phishing; spamming; copyright crimes; hacking; social engineering frauds. 1. 1 Wh at is fraud? 1 Fraud: its extent, patterns and causes Figure 1 Types of internal fraud Cash Non-cash Financial Non-fi nancial Confl icts of interest Bribery and extortion Asset misappropriation Fraudulent statements Corruption Internal fraud Fraud risk management: a guide to good practice 8 The fi nal of the three fraud categories is corruption. This includes activities such as the use of bribes or acceptance of ‘kickbacks’, improper use of confi dential information, confl icts of interest and collusive tendering. These types of internal fraud are summarised n Figure 1. Surveys have shown that asset misappropriation is the most widely reported type of fraud in UK, although corruption and bribery are growing the most rapidly. Further information on common types of internal fraud, and methods by which they may be perpetrated, is included in Appendix 2. This guide focuses on fraud against businesses, typically by those internal to the organisation. According to the Associa tion of Certifi ed Fraud Examiners (ACFE), there are three main categories of fraud that affect organisations. The fi rst of these is asset misappropriations, which involves the theft or misuse f an organisation’s assets. Examples include theft of plant, inventory or cash, false invoicing, accounts receivable fraud, and payroll fraud. The second category of fraud is fraudulent statements. This is usually in the form of falsifi cation of fi nancial statements in order to obtain some form of improper benefi t. It also includes falsifying documents such as employee credentials. 9 1. 2 The scale of the problem There have been many attempts to measure the true extent of fraud, but compiling reliable statistics around fraud is not easy. As one of the key aspects of fraud is deception, it can be diffi cult to identify and urvey results often only refl ect the instances of fraud that have actually been discovered. It is estimated that the majority of frauds go undetected and, even wh en a fraud has been found, it may not be reported. One reason for this may be that a company that has been a victim of fraud does not want to risk negative publicity. Also, it is often hard to distinguish fraud from carelessness and poor record keeping. Although survey results and research may not give a complete picture, the various statistics do offer a useful indication as to the extend of the problem. There can be no doubt that fraud is prevalent within organisations nd remains a serious issue. PricewaterhouseCooper’s Global Economic Crime Survey (PwC’s survey) in 2007 found that over 43% of international businesses were victims of fraud during the previous two years. In the UK, the fi gures were higher than the global average, with 48% of companies having fallen victim to fraud. Some surveys put the fi gures much higher. For example, during 2008, Kroll commissioned the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) to poll nearly 900 senior executives across the world. The EIU found that 85% of companies had suffered from at least one fraud in the past three years1. This fi gure had risen from 80% in a imilar poll in 2007. KPMG’s Fraud Barometer, which has been running since 1987, has also shown a considerable increase in the number of frauds committed in the UK in recent years, including a 50% rise in fraud cases in the fi rst half of 2008. According to the UK report of PwC’s survey, the average direct loss per company over a two year period as a result of fraud has risen to ? 1. 75 million, increasing from ? 0. 8 million in the equivalent 2005 survey. These fi gures exclude undetected losses and indirect costs to the business such as management costs or damage to reputation, which can be signifi cant. Management costs lone were estimated to be on average another ? 0. 75 million. Participants of the ACFE Report to the Nation 2008 (ACFE report) estimated that organisations lose 7% of their annual revenues to fraud. It is diffi cult to put a total cost on fraud, although many studies have tried to. For example an independent report by the Association of Chief Police Offi cers (the ACPO) in 2007 revealed that fraud results in losses of ? 20 billion each year in the UK. The World Bank has estimated that the global cost of corruption and bribery is about 5% of the value of the world economy or about $1. 5 trillion per year. It is thought that these stimates are conservative, and they also exclude other types of fraud such as misappropriation of assets. While it may be impossible to calculate the total cost of fraud, it is said to be more signifi cant than the total cost of most other crimes. According to the Attorney General in the UK, fraud is an area of crime which is second only to drug traffi cking in terms of causing harm to the economy and society2. 1 Kroll Global Fraud Report, Annual Edition 2008/2009 2 Attorney General’s interim report on the government’s Fraud Review, March 2006 Fraud risk managemen t: a guide to good practice 10 Case study 1 Fraud doesn’t just involve moneyCounterfeiting is one example of fraud that can have extremely serious consequences. Technology is ever improving, making it easier for counterfeiters to produce realistic looking packaging and fool legitimate wholesalers and retailers. Counterfeiting is a potentially lucrative business for the fraudster, with possibilities of large commercial profi ts, and it is a problem affecting a wide range of industries including wines and spirits, pharmaceuticals, electrical goods, and fashion. However, there are often many victims affected by such a fraud and not just the business that has been duped or had their brand exploited.For some, the outcome of counterfeiting goes way beyond fi nancial losses and can even be fatal: †¢ In late 2006, 14 Siberian towns declared a state of emergency due to mass poisonings caused by fake vodka. Around 900 people were hospitalised with liver failure after drinking indu strial solvent that was being sold as vodka. This is not a one off problem and sales of fake alcohol have been known to kill people. †¢ Also in 2006, a counterfeit product did result in more tragic consequences. At least 100 children died after ingesting cough syrup that had been mixed with counterfeit glycerine.The counterfeit compound, actually a dangerous solvent, had been used in place of more expensive glycerine. The manufacturing process had been sourced to China and the syrup passed through trading companies in Beijing and Barcelona before reaching its fi nal destination in Panama. The certifi cate attesting to the product’s purity was falsifi ed and not one of the trading companies tested the syrup to confi rm its contents along the way. It is thought that the number of deaths is likely to be much higher than the 100 cases that have been confi rmed. Fraud is often mistakenly considered a victimless rime. However, fraud can have considerable social and psychologic al effects on individuals, businesses and society. For example, when a fraud causes the collapse of a major company, numerous individuals and businesses can be affected. In addition to the company’s own employees, employees of suppliers can be affected by the loss of large orders, and other creditors, such as banks, can be indirectly affected by huge losses on loans. Consumers have to pay a premium for goods and services, in order to compensate for the costs of fraud losses and for money spent on investigations and additional security.Taxpayers also suffer due to reduced payments of corporation tax from businesses that have suffered losses. Fraud drains resources, affects public services and, perhaps of more concern, may fund other criminal and terrorist activity. According to the Fraud Review, fraud is a major and growing threat to public safety and prosperity. Case study 1 demonstrates just how much of a threat fraud can be to public safety and that there truly are victims of fraud. 11 1. 3 Which businesses are affected? Fraud is an issue that all organisations may face regardless of size, industry or country. If the rganisation has valuable property (cash, goods, information or services), then fraud may be attempted. It is often high profi le frauds in large multi-national organisations that are reported on in the media and smaller organisations may feel they are unlikely to be a target of fraudsters. However, according to the ACFE report, small businesses (classifi ed as those with less than 100 employees) suffer fraud more frequently than large organisations and are hit by higher average losses. When small companies are hit by large fraud losses, they are less likely to be able to absorb the damage han a larger company and may even go out of business as a result. The results of PwC’s survey showed that companies reporting fraud were spread across many industries, with at least a quarter of the respondents in any one industry suffering from f raudulent incidents. Industries suffering the highest average losses were insurance and industrial manufacturing. Losses in the fi nancial services industry, a sector frequently in the press and one with which fraud is often associated, were actually below average. Even not-for-profi t organisations are not immune to fraud, with government institutions nd many charities falling victim to unscrupulous fraudsters. As one director working in the international development and aid sector has pointed out, ‘In my sector, fraud is not a possibility, it is a reality and we are always dealing with a number of suspicious incidents on a more or less permanent basis. ’ PwC’s survey also revealed that incidences of fraud were highest in companies in North America, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where more than half of the companies reported fraud. It was lowest in the Western European region, although the UK was uch higher than the average for this region, with l evels of fraud similar to those in CEE. The EIU poll commissioned by Kroll in 2007 found that respondents in countries such as India and China have seen a signifi cant increase in the prevalence of corporate fraud in the last three years and this trend is likely to increase in businesses operating in emerging markets3. Although fraud is prevalent across organisations of all sizes and in all sectors and locations, research shows that certain business models will involve greater levels of fraud risk than others. The control environment hould be adjusted to fi t with the degree of risk exposure. Further guidance on risk assessment and controls is given in later chapters. 3 Kroll Global Fraud Report, Annual Edition 2007/2008 Fraud risk management: a guide to good practice 12 Case study 2 Size really doesn’t matter From a family affair†¦ A member of a small family business in Australia committed a $2m fraud, costing profi ts, jobs and a great deal of trust. The business owner s became suspicious when they realised that their son in law used the company diesel card to buy petrol for his own car.On closer scrutiny, they soon uncovered a company cheque for $80,000 made payable to the son in law’s personal account. BDO’s Brisbane offi ce discovered that the cheque and the fuel were just the tip of a vast iceberg. The company’s complex accounts system allowed the son in law to disguise cheques payable to himself as creditor payments. He then became a signatory and took ever larger cheques. He claimed that the poor cash fl ow was due to losses in one particular division which the family therefore closed, creating redundancies and losing what was in truth a successful business.The costs of ineffi cient accounting systems and undue trust can be massive. Every business should protect itself with thorough controls and vigilance. Adapted from ‘FraudTrack 5 Fraud: A Global Challenge’ published by BDO Stoy Hayward †¦ to a major corporate scandal WorldCom fi led for bankruptcy protection in June 2002. It was the biggest corporate fraud in history, largely a result of treating operating expenses as capital expenditure. WorldCom (now renamed MCI) admitted in March 2004 that the total amount by which it had misled investors over the previous 10 years was almost US$75 billion (? 2 billion) and reduced its stated pre-tax profi ts for 2001 and 2002 by that amount. WorldCom stock began falling in late 1999 as businesses slashed spending on telecom services and equipment. A series of debt downgrades raised borrowing costs for the company, struggling with about US$32 billion in debt. WorldCom used accounting tricks to conceal a deteriorating fi nancial condition and to infl ate profi ts. Former WorldCom chief executive Bernie Ebbers resigned in April 2002 amid questions about US$366 million in personal loans from the company and a federal probe of its accounting practices.Ebbers was subsequently charged with conspir acy to commit securities fraud and fi ling misleading data with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Scott Sullivan, former Chief Financial Offi cer, pleaded guilty to three criminal charges and was sentenced to fi ve years in prison. Ultimately, losses to WorldCom shareholders were close to US$180 billion and the fraud also resulted in the loss of 17,000 jobs. The SEC said that WorldCom had committed ‘accounting improprieties of unprecedented magnitude’ – proof, it said, of the need for reform in the regulation of corporate ccounting. Adapted from CIMA Offi cial Learning System, Management Accounting Risk and Control Strategy 13 1. 4 Why do people commit fraud? There is no single reason behind fraud and any explanation of it needs to take account of various factors. Looking from the fraudster’s perspective, it is necessary to take account of: †¢ motivation of potential offenders †¢ conditions unde r which people can rationalise their prospective crimes away †¢ opportunities to commit crime(s) †¢ perceived suitability of targets for fraud †¢ technical ability of the fraudster expected and actual risk of discovery after the fraud has been carried out †¢ expectations of consequences of discovery (including non-penal consequences such as job loss and family stigma, proceeds of crime confi scation, and traditional criminal sanctions) †¢ actual consequences of discovery. A common model that brings together a number of these aspects is the Fraud Triangle. This model is built on the premise that fraud is likely to result from a combination of three factors: motivation, opportunity and rationalisation. Motivation In simple terms, motivation is typically based on either reed or need. Stoy Hayward’s (BDO) most recent FraudTrack survey found that greed continues to be the main cause of fraud, resulting in 63% of cases in 2007 where a cause was cited. Other causes cited included problems from debts and gambling. Many people are faced with the opportunity to commit fraud, and only a minority of the greedy and needy do so. Personality and temperament, including how frightened people are about the consequences of taking risks, play a role. Some people with good objective principles can fall into bad company and develop tastes for the fast life, which empts them to fraud. Others are tempted only when faced with ruin anyway. Opportunity In terms of opportunity, fraud is more likely in companies where there is a weak internal control system, poor security over company property, little fear of exposure and likelihood of detection, or unclear policies with regard to acceptable behaviour. Research has shown that some employees are totally honest, some are totally dishonest, but that many are swayed by opportunity. Rationalisation Many people obey the law because they believe in it and/or they are afraid of being shamed or rejected by eople the y care about if they are caught. However, some people may be able to rationalise fraudulent actions as: †¢ necessary – especially when done for the business †¢ harmless – because the victim is large enough to absorb the impact †¢ justifi ed – because ‘the victim deserved it’ or ‘because I was mistreated. ’ Figure 2 The fraud triangle Motivation Opportunity The fraud triangle Rationalisation Fraud risk management: a guide to good practice 14 Case study 3 A breach of trust A good example of the fraud triangle in practice is the highly publicised case of the secretary that stole over ? . 3 million from her bosses at Goldman Sachs. Motivation There were some suggestions that Joyti De-Laurey originally started down her fraudulent path because of fi nancial diffi culties she found herself in before starting work at the investment bank. De-Laurey had previously run her own sandwich bar business, but it was closed down due to ins uffi cient fi nances. According to her defence, De-Laurey’s ‘fi rst bitter experience of fi nancial turmoil coincided with a novel introduction to a Dallas-type world where huge, unthinkable amounts of money stared her in the face, day in and day out. The motive behind the fraud was primarily greed though, with De-Laurey spending her ill gotten gains on a luxury lifestyle, including villas, cars, jewellery, designer clothes and fi rst class holidays. De-Laurey has even admitted that she did not steal because she needed to, but because she could. She explained that she fi rst started taking money simply to fi nd out if she could get away with it. She says that it then became ‘a bit addictive’ and that she ‘got a huge buzz from knowing they had no idea what I was doing. ’ Opportunity In terms of opportunity, De-Laurey’s bosses trusted her and held her in high regard.She had proved herself indispensable, on both business and personal fronts , and was given access to their cheque books in order to settle their domestic bills and personal fi nances. A little over a year after starting at Goldman Sachs, De-Laurey began forging her bosses’ signatures on personal cheques to make payments into her own accounts. Realising she had got away with it, De-Laurey continued to steal money by issuing forged cheques and making false money transfers. Before long she was forging signatures on a string of cash transfer authorities, siphoning off up to ? 2. million at a time from supposedly secure New York investments. Rationalisation De-Laurey was able to rationalise her actions by convincing herself that she had earned the money she stole. De-Laurey believed that she deserved the plundered amounts as a just reward for her dedication, discretion and loyalty, and claims that she had the consent of her bosses to take money in return for her ‘indispensable services’. The fact that they were so rich they did not even noti ce the money was missing, only served to fuel De-Laurey’s fraudulent activities. She justifi ed her actions through the belief that her bosses had cash to spare.According to De-Laurey; ‘They could afford to lose that money. ’ Caught out After four years of siphoning off vast amounts of money, De-Laurey was eventually caught when her boss at the time decided to make a six-fi gure donation to his former college. He took a look at his bank accounts to see if he could cover the donation and was surprised to fi nd the balance on the accounts so low. He investigated further and realised that large sums had been transferred to an unknown account. De-Laurey was the obvious suspect. By this time, De-Laurey had actually stolen around ? 3. 3 million from this particular boss.De-Laurey was the fi rst woman in the UK to be accused of embezzling such a large sum and, after a long and high profi le trial in 2004, she was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Various sources in cluding The Guardian, The Times, The Independent and the BBC News 15 One of the most effective ways to tackle the problem of fraud is to adopt methods that will decrease motive or opportunity, or preferably both. Rationalisation is personal to the individual and more diffi cult to combat, although ensuring that the company has a strong ethical culture and clear values should help. These methods and principles are developed further in later hapters of this guide. 1. 5 Who commits fraud? Different types of fraudster Fraudsters usually fall into one of three categories: 1 Pre-planned fraudsters, who start out from the beginning intending to commit fraud. These can be short-term players, like many who use stolen credit cards or false social security numbers; or can be longer-term, like bankruptcy fraudsters and those who execute complex money laundering schemes. 2 Intermediate fraudsters, who start off honest but turn to fraud when times get hard or when life events, such as irritation at being passed over for promotion or the need to pay for care for a family ember, change the normal mode. 3 Slippery-slope fraudsters, who simply carry on trading even when, objectively, they are not in a position to pay their debts. This can apply to ordinary traders or to major business people. In 2007, KPMG carried out research on the Profi le of a Fraudster (KPMG survey), using details of fraud cases in Europe, India, the Middle East and South Africa. The ACFE carried out similar research on frauds committed in the US. These surveys highlight the following facts and fi gures in relation to fraudsters: †¢ perpetrators are typically college educated white male most fraudsters are aged between 36 and 55 †¢ the majority of frauds are committed by men †¢ median losses caused by men are twice as great as those caused by women †¢ a high percentage of frauds are committed by senior management (including owners and executives) †¢ losses caused by managers are ge nerally more than double those caused by employees †¢ average losses caused by owners and executives are nearly 12 times those of employees †¢ longer term employees tend to commit much larger frauds †¢ fraudsters most often work in the fi nance department, operations/sales or as the CEO. The ACFE report also found that the type of person ommitting the offence depends on the nature of the fraud being perpetrated. Employees are most likely to be involved in asset misappropriation, whereas owners and executives are responsible for the majority of fi nancial statement frauds. Of the employees, the highest percentage of schemes involved those in the accounting department. These employees are responsible for processing and recording the organisation’s fi nancial transactions and so often have the greatest access to its fi nancial assets and more opportunity to conceal the fraud. Fraud risk management: a guide to good practice 16 Case study 4 Management riskIn 2007, a major British construction fi rm suffered from extensive fraud committed by management at one of its subsidiaries. Accounting irregularities dating back to 2003 were said to include systematic misrepresentation of production volumes and sales by a number of senior fi gures at the division. Management at the subsidiary attempted to cover their behaviour by selling materials at a discounted price and the fraud went undetected for several years despite internal and external audits. The irregularities were eventually uncovered by an internal team sent to investigate a mismatch between orders and sales.Following an initial internal investigation, a team of external experts and the police were brought in to identify the full extent of malpractice. The investigation found that the organisation was defrauded of nearly ? 23 million, but the fraud was said to cost the company closer to ? 40 million due to the written down value of the business and factoring in the cost of the investigation. The managing director of the subsidiary was dismissed, another manager faced disciplinary action and fi ve others left before disciplinary proceedings could be commenced. Civil proceedings were ruled out on the basis that osses were unlikely to be recovered. Operations at the centre of the incident had to be temporarily closed and more than 160 jobs were cut at the business. In addition to individual fraudsters, there has also been an increase in fraud being committed by gangs of organised criminals. Examples include false or stolen identities being used to defraud banks, and forms of e-fraud exploiting the use of internet by commercial businesses. SOCA is responsible for responding to such threats, with the support of the victim organisations. 1. 6 Summary A major reason why people commit fraud is because they are allowed to do so.There are a wide range of threats facing businesses. The threat of fraud can come from inside or outside the organisation, but the likelihood that a frau d will be committed is greatly decreased if the potential fraudster believes that the rewards will be modest, that they will be detected or that the potential punishment will be unacceptably high. The main way of achieving this must be to establish a comprehensive system of control which aims to prevent fraud, and where fraud is not prevented, increases the likelihood of detection and increases the cost to the fraudster. Later chapters of this guide set out some of the easures which can be put in place to minimise fraud risks to the organisation. Before looking specifi cally at fraud risk, the guide considers risk management in general. Risk management is defi ned as the ‘process of understanding and managing risks that the entity is inevitably subject to in attempting to achieve its corporate objectives’ (CIMA Offi cial Terminology, 2005). For an organisation, risks are potential events that could infl uence the achievement of the organisation’s objectives. Risk management is about understanding the nature of such events and, where they represent threats, making positive plans to mitigate them. Fraud s a major risk that threatens the business, not only in terms of fi nancial health but also its image and reputation. This guide is primarily focused on managing the risk of fraud, but fi rst, this chapter looks at more general aspects of risk management and corporate governance. 17 2 Risk management – an overview Risk management is an increasingly important process in many businesses and the process fi ts in well with the precepts of good corporate governance. In recent years, the issue of corporate governance has been a major area for concern in many countries. In the UK, the fi rst corporate governance report and code of best practice s considered to be the Cadbury Report in 1992, which was produced in response to a string of corporate collapses. There have been a number of reports since, covering provisions around areas such as exec utive remuneration, non-executive directors, and audit committees. The principles of these various reports have been brought together to form the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Combined Code). The Combined Code was fi rst introduced in 1998 and among other matters, calls for boards to establish systems of internal control and to review the effectiveness of these systems on a regular basis. UK isted companies are required to provide a statement in their annual reports confi rming that they comply with the Combined Code, and where they do not, they must provide an explanation for departures from it (the ‘comply or explain’ principle). The assessment of internal controls should be included in the report to shareholders. The Combined Code is reviewed regularly and the most recent version was published in June 2008. Following the original introduction of the Combined Code, the Turnbull Committee was set up to issue guidance to directors on how they should assess and report on their review of internal controls. TheTurnbull Committee made it clear that establishment of embedded risk management practices is key to effective internal control systems. The Turnbull guidance was fi rst published in 1999 and revised in 2005. In the revised report (sometimes referred to as Turnbull 2) there is now a requirement for directors to give explicit confi rmation that any signifi cant failings or weaknesses identifi ed from the review of effectiveness of internal controls have been, or are being, remedied. 2. 1 What is risk management? 2. 2 Corporate governance Fraud risk management: a guide to good practice 18 The Financial Reporting Council is responsible for aintaining and reviewing the Combined Code, although the Combined Code is annexed to the rules of the UK Listing Authority, which is part of the FSA. The FSA is responsible for ensuring that listed companies provide the appropriate ‘comply or explain’ statement in their annual report. While the guidance is generally applicable to listed companies, the principles are relevant to all organisations and have been widely used as a basis for codes of best practice in the public and not-for-profi t sectors. Fraud risk management practices are developing along the same lines. Many other countries have also produced reports on orporate governance, usually accompanied by codes of best practices. For example, South Africa has had the King Report (version I and now II) since 1994, Malaysia has had its Code of Corporate Governance in place since 2000 and Sri Lanka issued the Rules on Corporate Governance as part of its Listing Rules in January 2007. Corporate governance requirements in the US are now largely set out within the Sarbox legislation, further details on which are provided at Appendix 1. As previously mentioned, these requirements extend beyond the US, capturing any company that is SEC listed and its subsidiaries. Some other countries have lso introduced a statutory appr oach to corporate governance, such as that in the US, although none are currently as comprehensive. A number of international organisations have also launched guidelines and initiatives on corporate governance, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Commission. An example of a growing area of corporate governance is IT governance, which has developed in light of rapid and continuing advances in information technology. The following box gives more information on IT governance. IT Governance IT governance is about ensuring that the rganisation’s IT systems support and enable achievement of the organisation’s strategies and objectives. It encompasses leadership, organisational structures, businesses processes, standards and compliance. There are fi ve specifi c drivers for organisations to adopt IT governance strategies: †¢ regulatory requirements e. g. IT governance is covered by the Combined Code and Turnbull gu idance in the UK †¢ increasing intellectual capital value that the organisation has at risk †¢ alignment of technology with strategic organisational goals †¢ complexity of threats to information security †¢ increase in the compliance requirements of nformation and privacy-related regulation. A key benefi t of an effective, integrated IT governance framework is the integration of IT into the strategic and overall operational approach of an organisation. There are a series of international Information Security (IS) standards that provide guidance on implementing an effective IT governance framework, known as the ISO 27000 series. For example, ISO/IEC 27001 defi nes a set of IS management requirements in order to help organisations establish and maintain an IS management system. The standards apply to all types of organisation regardless of size or sector.They are particularly suitable where the protection of information is critical to the business, for example in t he fi nance, health and public sectors, and for organisations which manage information on behalf of others, such as IT outsourcing companies. ISACA also offers a series of IS standards and certifi cation. ISACA is a leading global association in the IT governance and control fi eld. With a network across more than 160 countries, its IS standards are followed by practitioners worldwide. Figure 3 The CIMA risk management cycle Controls assurance Controls assurance is the process whereby controls are eviewed by management and staff. There are various ways to conduct these exercises, from highly interactive workshops based on behavioural models at one end of the spectrum to pre-packaged self audit internal control questionnaires at the other. These models all include monitoring and risk assessment among their principal components. 19 The risk management cycle is an interactive process of identifying risks, assessing their impact, and prioritising actions to control and reduce risks. A n umber of iterative steps should be taken: 1 Establish a risk management group and set goals. 2 Identify risk areas. Understand and assess the scale of risk. 4 Develop a risk response strategy. 5 Implement the strategy and allocate responsibilities. 6 Implement and monitor the suggested controls. 7 Review and refi ne the process and do it again. 2. 3 The risk management cycle Identify risk areas Review and refi ne process and do it again Implementation and monitoring of controls Implement strategy and allocate responsibilities Understand and assess scale of risk Develop risk response strategy Information for decision making Establish risk management group and set goals Fraud risk management: a guide to good practice 20 2. Establish a risk management group and set goals A risk management group should be established whose task it is to facilitate and co-ordinate the overall risk management process. Possible members of the group could include a chief risk offi cer, a non executive direc tor, fi nance director, internal auditor, heads of planning and sales, treasurer and operational staff. Depending on the size and nature of the organisation, the risk management group may be in the form of a committee who meet from time to time. The risk management group will promote the understanding and assessment of risk, and facilitate the evelopment of a strategy for dealing with the risks identifi ed. They may also be responsible for conducting reviews of systems and procedures to identify and assess risks faced by the business, which include the risk of fraud, and introducing the controls that are best suited to the business unit. However, line managers and their staff may also be involved in the risk identifi cation and assessment process, with the risk management group providing guidance. 2. 5 Identify risk areas Each risk in the overall risk model should be explored to identify how it potentially evolves through the organisation.It is important to ensure that the risk is c arefully defi ned and explained to facilitate further analysis. The techniques of analysis include: †¢ workshops and interviews †¢ brainstorming †¢ questionnaires †¢ process mapping †¢ comparisons with other organisations †¢ discussions with peers. Once risks have been identifi ed, an assessment of possible impact and corresponding likelihood of occurrence should be made using consistent parameters that will enable the development of a prioritised risk analysis. In the planning stage, management should agree on the most appropriate defi nition and number of categories to be used when ssessing both likelihood and impact. The assessment of the impact of the risk should not simply take account of the fi nancial impact but should also consider the organisation’s viability and reputation, and recognise the political and commercial sensitivities involved. The analysis should either be qualitative or quantitative, and should be consistent to allow compa risons. The qualitative approach usually involves grading risks in high, medium and low categories. Impact The assessment of the potential impact of a particular risk may be complicated by the fact that a range of possible outcomes may exist or that the risk may occur number of times in a given period of time. Such complications should be anticipated and a consistent approach adopted which, for example, may seek to estimate a worst case scenario over, say, a 12 month time period. Likelihood of occurrence The likelihood of a risk occurring should be assessed on a gross, a net and a target basis. The gross basis assesses the inherent likelihood of the event occurring in the absence of any processes which the organisation may have in place to reduce that likelihood. The net basis assesses the likelihood, taking into account current conditions and processes to mitigate he chance of the event occurring. The target likelihood of a risk occurring refl ects the risk appetite of the organisa tion. 2. 6 Understand and assess the scale of risk 21 Where the net likelihood and the target likelihood for a particular risk differ, this would indicate the need to alter the risk profi le accordingly. It is common practice to assess likelihood in terms of: †¢ high – probable †¢ moderate – possible †¢ low – remote. An example of a risk analysis is contained in Appendix 3. The resulting document is often referred to as a risk register. The overall risk registers at organisational nd operational levels should include the risk of fraud being perpetrated. Some organisations also prepare detailed fraud risk registers that consider possible fraudulent activity. The fraud risk register often directs the majority of proactive fraud risk management work undertaken by an organisation. Analysing fraud risks Fraud risk is one component of operational risk. Operational risk focuses on the risks associated with errors or events in transaction processing or ot her business operations. A fraud risk review considers whether these errors or events could be the result of a deliberate act designed to benefi t the perpetrator.As a result, fraud risk reviews should be detailed exercises conducted by teams combining in depth knowledge of the business and market with detailed knowledge and experience of fraud. Risks such as false accounting or the theft of cash or assets need to be considered for each part of the organisation’s business. Frequently, businesses focus on a limited number of risks, most commonly on thirdparty thefts. To avoid this, the risks should be classifi ed by reference to the possible type of offence and the potential perpetrator(s). Fraud risks need to be assessed for each area and process of the business, for example, cash payments, ash receipts, sales, purchasing, expenses, inventory, payroll, fi xed assets and loans. Fraud risk management: a guide to good practice 22 2. 7 Develop a risk response strategy Once the ri sks have been identifi ed and assessed, strategies to deal with each risk identifi ed can be developed by line management, with guidance from the risk management group. Strategies for responding to risk generally fall into one of the following categories: †¢ risk retention (e. g. choosing to accept small risks) †¢ risk avoidance (e. g. stopping sale of certain products to avoid the risk to occurring) †¢ risk reduction (e. g. hrough implementing controls and procedures) †¢ risk transfer (e. g. contractual transfer of risk; transferring risks to insurers). Before strategies are developed, it is necessary to establish the risk appetite of the organisation. Risk appetite is the level of risk that the organisation is prepared to accept and this should be determined by the board. The appetite for risk will infl uence the strategies to be developed for managing risk. It is worth noting that a board’s risk appetite may vary for different types of risk and over tim e. For example, the board may have a low risk tolerance on compliance and egulatory issues, but be prepared to take signifi cant strategic risks. The board may also reduce their risk appetite as the external environment changes, such as in times of recession. 2. 8 Implement the strategy and allocate responsibilities The chosen strategy should be allocated and communicated to those responsible for implementation. For the plan to be effective it is essential that responsibility for each specifi c action is assigned to the appropriate operational manager and that clear target dates are established for each action. It is also important to obtain the co-operation of those esponsible for the strategy, by formal communication, seminars, action plans and adjustments to budgets. The chosen strategy may require the implementation of new controls or the modifi cation of existing controls. Businesses are dynamic and the controls that are in place will need to be monitored to assess whether or n ot they are succeeding in their objectives. The risk management group should be empowered to monitor the effectiveness of the actions being taken in each specifi c area, as these can be affected by internal and external factors, such as changes in the marketplace or the introduction of new computer systems. . 10 Review and refi ne and do it again All of the elements outlined above form part of an iterative cycle where risk management is continually reviewed and developed. As the cycle continues, risk management should increasingly become embedded in the organisation so that it really becomes part of everyone’s job. 2. 11 Information for decision making Risk management should form a key part of the organisation’s decision-making process. Information is gathered at all stages of the risk management cycle and this information should be fed into the decision-making mechanisms. For more information on risk management, please refer o CIMA’s publication Risk Management : A guide to good practice. 2. 9 Implement and monitor suggested controls 23 There are risks in most situations. Risk management is an important element of corporate governance and every organisation should review their risk status and develop their approach as described in the CIMA Risk Management Cycle in 2. 3 to 2. 11 above. Managing the risk of fraud is the same in principle as managing any other business risk. First, the potential consequences of fraud on the organisation need to be understood, using the principles set out in this chapter. The risks should then be reduced by developing nd implementing an anti-fraud strategy across the organisation. This is best approached systematically, both at the organisational level, for example by using ethics policies and anti-fraud policies, and at the operational level, through introduction of controls and procedures. The following chapters expand on the fraud risk management process in the context of an antifraud strategy. 2. 12 Summar y Fraud risk management: a guide to good practice Given the prevalence of fraud and the negative consequences associated with it, there is a compelling argument that organisations should invest time and resources towards tackling fraud.There is, however, sometimes debate as to whether these resources should be committed to fraud prevention or fraud detection. Fraud prevention Based on the earlier discussion aroun

Beginning Your Mystery Novel

Beginning Your Mystery Novel Beginning Your Mystery Novel Beginning Your Mystery Novel By Maeve Maddox Youve got a great idea for a mystery novel. You can hardly wait to get started, but before you launch into that first chapter, three steps can save you hours of frustration and repair work later. 1. With the murder as the central event, draw a time line. Indicate where every character is at any given time. This will aid you in the creation of alibis. It will also prevent you from placing a character in two places at the same time. Have a clear idea from the outset as to what period of time your story will cover. Suspense is always greater when the action takes place within strict time constraints. 2. Write brief a biographical sketch for each character. You may have only three characters to begin with: victim, detective, and person telling the story. As new characters enter the story, add their bios. Take the time to think of appropriate names for your characters. Using temporary names and changing them later is counterproductive. Names contribute to a sense of character. The biographies neednt be lengthy. Obvious information needed: the characters physical appearance age gender aspirations role in the story Knowing the characters likes and dislikes, past disappointments, and at least one childhood trauma will feed your unconscious mind, contributing to the plot in ways you cant anticipate when you begin your story. If in addition you give each character a secret, the way is clear to provide false leads by making the innocent characters behave in suspicious ways. 3. Keep your draft in one word processing file, not in separate files for each chapter. Having it all in one big file will simplify revision. You will want to rearrange chapters and spread out information. Its much easier to do that when the entire draft is in one searchable file. Want to improve your English in five minutes a day? Get a subscription and start receiving our writing tips and exercises daily! Keep learning! Browse the Fiction Writing category, check our popular posts, or choose a related post below:25 Subordinating ConjunctionsHow Long Should a Paragraph Be?Sentence Adverbs

Essay grammar check for students

Essay grammar check for students Essay Grammar Check Anybody can write an essay; however, essay grammar check requires more than word processing software can provide. Most students are not sure about the quality of the paper, if they do not edit the paper on their own. The word processing software, used by most of them, cannot guarantee perfect grammar check. High-quality editing can be provided only by a professional editor. When you are making a grammar check with the help of computer software, you should understand that it can follow grammar rules, but is mainly based on how it is programmed. Much more profitable is grammar check that is done by a real person. Editors, who work in proofreading services, are well-educated, experienced and trained. Student can ask for proofreading of the paper provided by a professional editor with a PhD degree. If you need a simple essay grammar check, you may turn to the student, who has a huge academic performance. Besides essays proofreading, specialized services also offer:Proofreading and Editing of DissertationsEditing a dissertation includes not just correcting spelling, punctuation and grammar mistakes. This work is much more complex if to compare dissertation proofreading with the essay check. Such companies offer their customers not just essay proofreading and editing services. They also ensure the paper has a proper format, check whether the title, foreword, appendices, bibliography, etc. correspond to the universitys requirements.Proofreading of Thesis papersCompanies that provide proofreading of essays employ editors in various academic fields. These include not only essays, but journals, thesis papers, online/offline publications, dissertations and other papers. The chief editor of the company you turn to will assign an expert in your study field to complete a perfect proofreading of your paper. This is done to make sure that the editing is based on the language required. Therefore, if you are a natural sciences student, you will receive your paper that is edited by a person who had been a degree in this field. Procedures on spelling and grammar check vary in dependence on the subject.Research Papers editingEach research paper includes a huge amount of details, citations and references. It should follow a strict structure to guarantee a thorough discussion of the research topic. It is not enough to provide a simple grammar check for the research paper. Proofreading an essay differs from essay editing significantly. You should remember that the message of a research should follow the rigid format, whereas an essay might be more free-written and can follow any writing style and format. Therefore, editing an essay is much simpler if compared to proofreading a research paper. We have mentioned just a few paper types that you can ask to check for grammar and spelling. Proofreading of an essay is one of the functions provided by any editing service that you can find in the Internet. However, our service offers proofreading of any paper you need.

Merendar Conjugation in Spanish, Translation, and Examples

Merendar Conjugation in Spanish, Translation, and Examples The Spanish verb merendar means to snack or to have a snack. It is similar to verbs like desayunar, almorzar, and cenar because the verb itself tells you what meal you are having. In the case of merendar, it can be a small snack anytime during the day, but in some cultures it can refer to an afternoon coffee or tea time, usually accompanied by a small snack, or to the meal eaten during a snack break at school. Another way to say merendar is comer una merienda (to eat a snack). Merendar is a stem-changing -ar verb. This means that in some conjugations where the second e of the stem is part of a stressed syllable, the e changes to ie. This is similar to other stem-changing verbs such as querer. This article includes merendar conjugations in the indicative mood (present, past, conditional, and future), the subjunctive mood (present and past), the imperative mood, and other verb forms. Merendar Present Indicative In the present indicative, the stem change e to ie occurs in all the conjugations except nosotros and vosotros. Yo meriendo I snack Yo meriendo a media maà ±ana. Tà º meriendas You snack Tà ºmeriendaspor la tarde. Usted/à ©l/ella merienda You/he/she snacks Ella meriendapan con queso. Nosotros merendamos We snack Nosotros merendamos a la hora del cafà ©. Vosotros merendis Yousnack Vosotros merendis fruta para mantener la dieta. Ustedes/ellos/ellas meriendan You/they snack Ellos meriendandos veces al dà ­a en la escuela. Merendar Preterite Indicative There is no stem change in the preterite tense. Yo merendà © I snacked Yo merendà © a media maà ±ana. Tà º merendaste You snacked Tà ºmerendastepor la tarde. Usted/à ©l/ella merendà ³ You/he/she snacked Ella merendà ³pan con queso. Nosotros merendamos We snacked Nosotros merendamos a la hora del cafà ©. Vosotros merendasteis Yousnacked Vosotros merendasteis fruta para mantener la dieta. Ustedes/ellos/ellas merendaron You/they snacked Ellos merendarondos veces al dà ­a en la escuela. Merendar Imperfect Indicative There are no stem changes in the imperfect tense. The imperfect can be translated to English as was snacking or used to snack. Yo merendaba I used to snack Yo merendaba a media maà ±ana. Tà º merendabas Youused to snack Tà ºmerendabaspor la tarde. Usted/à ©l/ella merendaba You/he/she used to snack Ella merendabapan con queso. Nosotros merendbamos We used to snack Nosotros merendbamos a la hora del cafà ©. Vosotros merendabais Youused to snack Vosotros merendabais fruta para mantener la dieta. Ustedes/ellos/ellas merendaban You/they used to snack Ellos merendabandos veces al dà ­a en la escuela. Merendar Future Indicative There are no stem changes in the future indicative, since its conjugation includes the whole infinitive merendar. Yo merendarà © I will snack Yo merendarà © a media maà ±ana. Tà º merendars You will snack Tà ºmerendarspor la tarde. Usted/à ©l/ella merendar You/he/she will snack Ella merendarpan con queso. Nosotros merendaremos We will snack Nosotros merendaremos a la hora del cafà ©. Vosotros merendarà ©is Youwill snack Vosotros merendarà ©is fruta para mantener la dieta. Ustedes/ellos/ellas merendarn You/they will snack Ellos merendarndos veces al dà ­a en la escuela. Merendar Periphrastic  Future Indicative   Yo voy a merendar I am going to snack Yo voya merendar a media maà ±ana. Tà º vasa merendar You are going to snack Tà ºvasa merendar por la tarde. Usted/à ©l/ella vaa merendar You/he/she is going tosnack Ella vaa merendar pan con queso. Nosotros vamosa merendar We are going to snack Nosotros vamosa merendar a la hora del cafà ©. Vosotros vaisa merendar Youare going tosnack Vosotros vaisa merendar fruta para mantener la dieta. Ustedes/ellos/ellas vana merendar You/they are going tosnack Ellos vana merendar dos veces al dà ­a en la escuela. Merendar Present Progressive/Gerund Form The present progressive is formed with the present participle or gerund. Present Progressive ofMerendar est merendando Is snacking Ella est merendando pan con queso. Merendar Past Participle The present perfect is formed with the verb haber and the past participle. Present Perfect of Merendar ha merendado Has snacked Ella ha merendado pan con queso. Merendar Conditional Indicative There are no stem changes in the conditional tense, since it also uses the whole infinitive merendar. Yo merendarà ­a I would snack Yo merendarà ­a a media maà ±ana si tuviera hambre. Tà º merendarà ­as You would snack Tà ºmerendarà ­aspor la tarde pero no tienes tiempo. Usted/à ©l/ella merendarà ­a You/he/she would snack Ella merendarà ­apan con queso si no estuviera a dieta. Nosotros merendarà ­amos We would snack Nosotros merendarà ­amos a la hora del cafà ©, pero nos da hambre ms temprano. Vosotros merendarà ­ais Youwould snack Vosotros merendarà ­ais fruta para mantener la dieta, pero no os importa romperla. Ustedes/ellos/ellas merendarà ­an You/they would snack Ellos merendarà ­andos veces al dà ­a en la escuela si los maestros lo permitieran. Merendar Present Subjunctive Notice that in the present subjunctive the stem change e to ie occurs in all the conjugations except nosotros and vosotros, just like in the present indicative tense. Que yo meriende That I snack La maestra quiere que yo meriende a media maà ±ana. Que tà º meriendes That you snack Tu madre espera que tà º meriendes por la tarde. Que usted/à ©l/ella meriende That you/he/she snack La doctora recomienda que ella no meriende pan con queso. Que nosotros merendemos That we snack El jefe prefiere que nosotros merendemos a la hora del cafà ©. Que vosotros merendà ©is That you snack El nutricionista sugiere que vosotros merendà ©is fruta para mantener la dieta. Que ustedes/ellos/ellas merienden That you/they snack El padre quiere que ellos merienden dos veces al dà ­a en la escuela. Merendar Imperfect Subjunctive There are two different ways of conjugating the imperfect subjunctive. Neither option has a spelling change. Option 1 Que yo merendara That I snacked La maestra querà ­a que yo merendara a media maà ±ana. Que tà º merendaras That you snacked Tu madre esperaba que tà º merendaras por la tarde. Que usted/à ©l/ella merendara That you/he/she snacked La doctora recomendaba que ella no merendara pan con queso. Que nosotros merendramos That we snacked El jefe preferà ­a que nosotros merendramos a la hora del cafà ©. Que vosotros merendarais That you snacked El nutricionista sugerà ­a que vosotros merendarais fruta para mantener la dieta. Que ustedes/ellos/ellas merendaran That you/they snacked El padre querà ­a que ellos merendaran dos veces al dà ­a en la escuela. Option 2 Que yo merendase That I snacked La maestra querà ­a que yo merendase a media maà ±ana. Que tà º merendases That you snacked Tu madre esperaba que tà º merendases por la tarde. Que usted/à ©l/ella merendase That you/he/she snacked La doctora recomendaba que ella no merendase pan con queso. Que nosotros merendsemos That we snacked El jefe preferà ­a que nosotros merendsemos a la hora del cafà ©. Que vosotros merendaseis That you snacked El nutricionista sugerà ­a que vosotros merendaseis fruta para mantener la dieta. Que ustedes/ellos/ellas merendasen That you/they snacked El padre querà ­a que ellos merendasen dos veces al dà ­a en la escuela. Merendar Imperative The imperative mood is used to give commands. There are both positive and negative commands, some of which have the spelling change e to ie. Positive Commands Tà º merienda Snack!  ¡Merienda por la tarde! Usted meriende Snack!  ¡Meriende pan con queso! Nosotros merendemos Let's snack!  ¡Merendemos a la hora del cafà ©! Vosotros merendad Snack!  ¡Merendad fruta para mantener la dieta! Ustedes merienden Snack!  ¡Merienden dos veces al dà ­a en la escuela! Negative Commands Tà º no meriendes Don't snack!  ¡No meriendes por la tarde! Usted no meriende Don't snack!  ¡No meriende pan con queso! Nosotros no merendemos Let's not snack!  ¡No merendemos a la hora del cafà ©! Vosotros no merendà ©is Don't snack!  ¡No merendà ©is fruta para mantener la dieta! Ustedes no merienden Don't snack!  ¡No merienden dos veces al dà ­a en la escuela!